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IS PROTECTING AN EMPLOYEE’S RIGHT TO
KNOWINGLY FILE FALSE EEOC CHARGES A
NECESSARY EVIL?
Lawrence D. Rosenthal*
In addition to prohibiting workplace discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 protects: (1) employees who oppose an employer’s
discriminatory employment practices, and (2) employees who participate
in Title VII’s enforcement process. Thus, not only are employees
protected from workplace discrimination based on particular traits, but
they are also protected from retaliation if they attempt to vindicate their
right to be free from workplace discrimination either internally with their
employer or externally with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).
When analyzing retaliation cases, courts agree on several
principles. Most importantly, courts agree that the McDonnell-Douglas
burden-shifting paradigm applies, which requires (1) the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case; (2) the employer to articulate a legitimate,
non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action; and then (3)
the plaintiff to demonstrate the employer’s articulated reason for the
adverse employment action was pretext for the real reason: unlawful
retaliation.
This Article will focus on the first part of this framework–the prima
facie case. When establishing a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action. This Article will
focus on the first element of the prima facie case–protected activity.
Specifically, the Article will address whether an employee who knowingly
files a false discrimination charge with the EEOC (or who knowingly
provides false testimony during the EEO process) engages in protected
activity, or whether he loses protection if he engages in this type of
deceptive behavior.
* Associate Dean for Academics and Professor of Legal Writing, Northern Kentucky
University—Salmon P. Chase College of Law; J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School; LL.M.,
Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank his research assistant, Ms.
Sarah Benedict, for all of the assistance she provided during the writing of this Article.
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This Article will argue that, despite the uneasy feeling courts might
have protecting individuals who engage in this type of behavior,
protecting these individuals might, in fact, be necessary. The reasons
behind this pro-employee conclusion are the following: (1) Title VII’s
language is broad and arguably requires this result; (2) the EEOC
believes Title VII covers all employees who file EEOC charges and who
testify in EEO proceedings; (3) providing this protection will not result
in employees being able to guarantee themselves workplace tenure
simply by filing EEOC charges; and (4) providing protection is
consistent with Congress’s goals of providing access to Title VII’s
remedial scheme and not wanting to dissuade employees from bringing
legitimate discrimination claims or supporting other employees’
legitimate claims.
So, while it might seem wrong to protect employees who knowingly
file false discrimination charges (or who knowingly provide false
testimony in an EEO proceeding), there are several reasons why courts
might just have to do that very thing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In addition to prohibiting workplace discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin,1 Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 also protects employees who oppose their employers’
unlawful discriminatory practices and employees who participate in
the statute’s enforcement process.2 Other federal anti-discrimination
statutes also prohibit retaliation against employees who engage in
similar activities.3 Thus, not only are employees protected from
workplace discrimination based on particular traits, but they are also
protected from employer retaliation if they attempt to vindicate their
rights either internally with their employer or externally with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).4
When analyzing retaliation claims, courts agree on several
principles. One of the most important issues on which courts agree is
that the McDonnell-Douglas5 burden-shifting paradigm applies to
retaliation cases, and this paradigm requires the following: (A) the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case; (B) the employer must then
articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse
employment action; and (C) then the plaintiff must demonstrate the
employer’s articulated reason for the adverse employment action was
pretext for the real reason: unlawful retaliation.6
This Article will focus on the first part of this framework—the
prima facie case. When establishing a prima facie case, a plaintiff must
prove: (A) he engaged in a protected activity; (B) he suffered an
adverse employment action; and (C) there was a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.7
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
2. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
3. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2018); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting discrimination based upon race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting retaliation).
5. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
6. Id. at 801–04.
7. See, e.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 88 (1st Cir. 2005); Calero-Cerezo v.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004). Some courts list a fourth element—employer
knowledge of the protected activity. See, e.g., Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 844 (2d
Cir. 2013); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 578 (6th Cir. 2000). Although not all
courts list this element, employer knowledge is critical; if an employer has no knowledge of a
protected activity, it cannot have a retaliatory motive for the adverse employment action. See
Noviello, 398 F.3d at 88 (explaining that in order for a plaintiff to show that he or she suffered an
adverse employment action as a result of his or her conduct, it must necessarily be true that the
defendant knew about the conduct).
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This Article will address the first element of the prima facie case—
protected activity. Specifically, the Article will address whether an
employee who knowingly files a false discrimination charge with the
EEOC engages in protected activity, or whether he loses protection if
he engages in that type of behavior.8 Despite the uneasy feeling courts
might have protecting individuals who engage in this behavior, this
Article will argue that protecting those individuals might, in fact, be
necessary until Congress or the Supreme Court decides otherwise.9
Part II of this Article describes Title VII’s relevant statutory
language, addressing two types of activities the statute protects—
opposition and participation.10 Part III analyzes cases that have
addressed the level of protection afforded to employees who
knowingly file false charges or engage in other participation activity.11
Finally, Part IV explains why courts might have to protect employees
who engage in this behavior, despite the uneasy feeling doing so might
create.12
The reasons behind this pro-employee conclusion are the
following: (A) Title VII’s language is broad and arguably requires this
result;13 (B) the EEOC believes the participation clause covers all
employees who file EEOC charges;14 (C) providing this protection
8. This Article will also address other types of “participation activity” such as providing
testimony in an EEO proceeding. Filing EEOC charges and providing testimony in an EEO
proceeding are protected under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision’s participation clause, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and thus should receive the same level of protection.
9. Even when judges protect these activities, they have expressed concern over doing so. See,
e.g., Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (acknowledging that
protecting false and malicious claims might seem “unappealing” but ultimately concluding that not
protecting them was a less desirable outcome).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III. Some of these cases addressed similar, but not identical, situations;
however, those courts’ reasonings are also applicable to the filing of false charges.
12. See infra Part IV; see also supra note 9 (discussing judicial concern over protecting false
and malicious claims).
13. See infra Section IV.A.
14. See infra Section IV.B. The EEOC does not, however, believe false or malicious charges
should go without consequences:
False or bad faith statements by either the employee or the employer should be taken
into appropriate account by the factfinder, investigator, or adjudicator of the EEO
allegation when weighing credibility, ruling on procedural matters, deciding on the scope
of the factfinding process, and deciding if the claim has merit. It is the Commission’s
position, however, that an employer can be liable for retaliation if it takes it upon itself
to impose consequences for actions taken in the course of participation.
Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-retaliationand-related-issues.
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will not result in bad employees being able to guarantee themselves
workplace tenure by filing EEOC charges;15 and (D) providing
protection is consistent with Congress’s goals of providing access to
Title VII’s remedial scheme and not wanting to dissuade employees
from pursuing legitimate discrimination claims and/or testifying in
connection with other employees’ legitimate claims.16
Now, and consistent with the canon of statutory construction
requiring courts to look first at statutory language when interpreting a
statute,17 this Article will address Title VII’s relevant language.
II. TITLE VII’S RELEVANT LANGUAGE
As noted earlier, Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes
contain anti-retaliation provisions that protect employees who engage
in EEO activities.18 These activities include, but are not limited to,
lodging internal complaints, filing charges with the EEOC, and
testifying in someone else’s EEO proceeding.19 Specifically, Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment, . . . because he has opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter.20
In this provision, there are two clauses that provide protection:
there is the “opposition clause” (which prohibits retaliation “because
[a plaintiff] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

15. See infra Section IV.C.
16. See infra Section IV.D.
17. See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010); Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018); see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2018) (prohibiting retaliation against an individual for making a claim or
assisting in an investigation under the ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (prohibiting discrimination
against an individual for making a claim or assisting in an investigation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act).
19. See Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra note 14. The Supreme
Court has also decided that answering an employer’s questions regarding another individual’s
internal EEO complaint qualifies as opposition. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson
Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276–78 (2009).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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practice by this subchapter”),21 and there is the “participation clause”
(which prohibits retaliation “because [a plaintiff] has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter”).22 Although each
clause provides protection, the types of activities protected under each
clause, and the scope of the protection, are different.23
When deciding whether an employee’s actions qualify as
opposition or participation, some courts invoke the opposition clause
when an EEOC charge has not yet been filed,24 and they invoke the
participation clause once a charge has been filed.25 Regardless of how
courts make this distinction, this distinction is critical because most
courts provide more protection under the participation clause.26 As a
result, many employees try to seek protection under the participation
clause, while many employers try to characterize employees’ activities
as falling under the less protective opposition clause.27

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he scope
of protection for activity falling under the participation clause is broader than for activity falling
under the opposition clause.” (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259
n.4 (4th Cir. 1998))); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir.
1989) (noting the distinction between participation and opposition is “significant because federal
courts have generally granted less protection for opposition than for participation in enforcement
proceedings”). But see Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that the levels of protection are the same under both clauses).
24. See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174
(11th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001).
25. Id. (noting the participation clause “protects proceedings and activities which occur in
conjunction with or after the filing of a formal charge with the EEOC; it does not include
participating in an employer’s internal, in-house investigation, conducted apart from a formal
charge with the EEOC”). The EEOC has taken a different approach, stating:
The Commission and the Solicitor General have long taken the view that participation
and opposition have some overlap, in that raising complaints, serving as a voluntary or
involuntary witness, or otherwise participating in an employer’s internal complaint or
investigation process, whether before or after an EEOC or Fair Employment Practices
Agency (FEPA) charge has been filed, is covered under the broad protections of the
participation clause, although it is also covered as “opposition.”
Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra note 14.
26. See, e.g., Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151; Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259 n.4; see also Vasconcelos
v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Accusations made in the context of charges before
the Commission are protected by statute; charges made outside of that context are made at the
accuser’s peril.”).
27. See, e.g., Total Sys. Servs., 221 F.3d at 1174 (noting that the EEOC argued the employee’s
activity fell under the participation clause, while the employer argued the activity fell under the
opposition clause).
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A. The Opposition Clause
The first type of activity Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
protects is “opposition” activity.28 The scope of this protection is
broad, protecting activities such as making Title VII complaints to
employers, refusing to follow an employer’s order that violates Title
VII, and engaging in other activities that “oppose” an employer’s
unlawful discriminatory policies.29 Although the opposition clause’s
protection is broad, it is typically less broad than the participation
clause’s protection.30 The critical difference between these provisions
is that, to be protected, the opposition activity must be based on a
reasonable, good-faith belief the employer is violating, or has violated,
Title VII.31 And, as will be addressed, most jurisdictions do not apply
this same standard to the participation clause, providing almost
unlimited protection for those who engage in participation activities.32
One of the most common types of opposition activity is lodging
internal discrimination complaints.33 As previously noted, for those
complaints to be protected, the employee’s belief the employer is
violating, or has violated, Title VII must be a reasonable, good-faith
belief.34 If an employee’s belief of unlawful activity is not a
reasonable, good-faith belief, the opposition clause will not protect the
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018).
29. See Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance
/questions-and-answers-enforcement-guidance-retaliation-and-related-issues. As noted supra note
25, the EEOC believes lodging internal complaints can qualify as participation. Courts have
rejected that approach, see, e.g., Total Sys. Servs., 221 F.3d at 1174, however, after Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), there is a legitimate argument that internal complaints
should qualify as participation. In Faragher, the Court imposed a requirement that Title VII
plaintiffs must, in certain circumstances, first notify the employer of the alleged discrimination. Id.
at 807–08. As a result, internal complaints have essentially become part of the EEO process and
could qualify as participation. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument in Total Sys. Servs., 221
F.3d at 1174 n.3. In her dissent from the denial of rehearing of Total Sys. Servs., Judge Barkett
acknowledged this argument. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 240 F.3d
899, 903–04 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151 (quoting Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259 n.4).
31. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (utilizing a reasonable, goodfaith-belief test when deciding an opposition case).
32. See, e.g., Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151–52 (noting the participation clause provides more
protection than the opposition clause). But see Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th
Cir. 2004) (holding both clauses provide the same level of protection).
33. See Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues,
supra note 29. As was stated earlier, the Supreme Court has decided answering an employer’s
questions regarding another individual’s internal EEO complaint also qualifies as opposition.
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276–78 (2009).
34. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71.
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employee.35 As a result, employees must be careful when deciding
whether to lodge internal discrimination complaints, as doing so
without what a court ultimately determines is a reasonable, good-faith
belief of unlawful activity could result in an adverse employment
action without a remedy.36 If, however, the employee files an EEOC
charge (activity that falls under the participation clause), that
employee will most likely receive greater protection.37 The Article
will now address the participation clause.
B. The Participation Clause
The second type of activity the anti-retaliation provision protects
is “participation” activity.38 The scope of this protection is supposed
to be very broad (most courts believe this provision’s protections are
more broad than the opposition clause’s protections),39 and the clause
protects actions such as filing EEOC charges, testifying in Title VII
proceedings, and assisting other employees in their Title VII
proceedings.40 For reasons that will be discussed throughout this
Article, the protection offered by this clause is quite broad, which is
why plaintiffs try to cast their activity as participation rather than
opposition whenever it is possible for them to do so.41
The biggest difference between these two clauses is that while all
courts agree opposition activities must be based on a reasonable, goodfaith belief the employer is violating, or has violated, Title VII,42
courts are split as to whether that same standard applies to

35. Id.
36. See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the
Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation
Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1142–44 (2007).
37. Some employees, however, might lose a subsequent lawsuit for not bringing the alleged
harassment to the employer’s attention prior to filing an EEOC charge. See Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018); see also Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance
on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra note 29 (explaining what the participation clause protects).
39. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998)).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
41. See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171,
1174–76 (11th Cir. 2000) (disagreeing with the EEOC’s argument that the at-issue activity fell
under the participation clause), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001).
42. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (applying the reasonable,
good-faith-belief standard to an opposition case).

(8) 54.4_ROSENTHAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1160

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

11/18/21 12:37 PM

[Vol. 54:1151

participation activities.43 Courts that do not limit the participation
clause do so because of the participation clause’s language, the
EEOC’s position on this issue, and for policy reasons.44 Courts that do
apply the reasonable, good-faith-belief standard to participation cases
do so as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark County
School District v. Breeden45 (although that case involved opposition,
not participation)46 and for policy reasons.47
This Article will address an issue regarding the scope of the
participation clause—whether an employee who knowingly engages
in false participation activity such as filing a false EEOC charge
receives protection. Courts that use the reasonable, good-faith-belief
standard for participation cases reject this type of claim;48 however,
other courts have reached a different conclusion regarding whether the
participation clause covers knowingly false participation activities.49
The Article will now address how the courts have treated this issue.
III. THE SPLIT REGARDING KNOWINGLY ENGAGING IN FALSE
PARTICIPATION ACTIVITIES
As previously noted, some courts protect employees who
knowingly engage in false participation activities.50 These courts do
so for several reasons, including the participation clause’s language,51
the EEOC’s position on the issue,52 the belief that doing so will not
provide workplace tenure for bad employees,53 and because Title VII’s
43. Compare Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
reasonable, good-faith-belief standard applies to all retaliation claims), with Total Sys. Servs., 221
F.3d at 1174–76 (noting different levels of protection under the opposition clause and the
participation clause).
44. See infra Section III.A.
45. 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
46. Id. at 270. For a thorough discussion of Breeden and the participation clause, see Lawrence
D. Rosenthal, Reading Too Much into What the Court Doesn’t Write: How Some Federal Courts
Have Limited Title VII’s Participation Clause’s Protections After Clark County School District v.
Breeden, 83 WASH. L. REV. 345 (2008).
47. See, e.g., Mattson, 359 F.3d at 890–91; see also infra Section III.B (discussing court
decisions and policy reasons for not extending the participation clause protection).
48. See, e.g., Mattson, 359 F.3d at 892.
49. See infra Section III.A (discussing cases that have granted broad protection under the
participation clause). Some of these cases did not reach this specific issue, and some specifically
declined to address it; nonetheless, because these courts provided protection under similar
circumstances, those courts’ reasoning could apply to this situation. See id.
50. Several of those cases will be discussed in this Section.
51. See infra Section IV.A and cases cited therein.
52. See infra Section IV.B and cases cited therein.
53. See infra Section IV.C and cases cited therein.
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purpose and structure support broad protection under the participation
clause.54 Other courts, however, have been less inclined to provide
protection under these circumstances, believing Congress could not
have intended such a result and that the Supreme Court’s Breeden
decision applies to participation activities.55 This part will provide
examples of cases that have addressed the scope of the participation
clause’s protection; the first section will discuss cases where the court
adopted a pro-employee position, and the second section will discuss
cases where the court adopted a pro-employer approach.
A. Courts that Have Taken a Pro-Employee Position
Although it might seem odd to protect employees who knowingly
engage in false participation activities, several courts have leaned in
that direction.56 These courts did so for a variety of reasons, including
Title VII’s language, the EEOC’s position regarding this issue, and
several policy reasons.57 These pro-employee cases, at both the
appellate level and trial level, will now be addressed.
The opinion on which most courts rely for the proposition that the
participation clause protects almost all participation activity is Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.58 The question the court answered in
Pettway was the following: “[W]hether a charge filed pursuant to
[Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision] prohibits an employer from
discharging an employee for having made false statements in a request
for reconsideration of his case before the [EEOC].”59 The district court
determined the plaintiff’s statements were not protected, but the Fifth
Circuit reversed.60
In Pettway, the plaintiff filed a charge alleging racial
discrimination.61 The EEOC dismissed the charge, believing the
employer did not violate Title VII.62 After the plaintiff received the
EEOC’s determination, the EEOC informed the plaintiff he could
54. See infra Section IV.D and cases cited therein.
55. See infra Section III.B and cases cited therein.
56. See supra note 9. Those cases will be discussed in this Section.
57. See infra Section III.A.
58. 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969). As discussed below, the pro-employee cases refer to Pettway
for the assertion that the participation clause’s protection is very broad. See Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t
Div., 170 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1006 n.18).
59. Pettway, 411 F.2d at 999–1000.
60. Id. at 1000.
61. Id. at 1001.
62. Id.
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submit additional information, and it was that submission the plaintiff
claimed the participation clause protected.63 In that submission, the
plaintiff suggested there was some type of cover-up or bribery
between the EEOC and the employer.64 Soon after the plaintiff
submitted this document, his employer discharged him.65 Predictably,
the plaintiff filed another charge, this time alleging retaliation.66
After addressing a preliminary issue, the court addressed Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision’s scope.67 The employer argued the
plaintiff’s letter was not protected because it “constitute[d] a false and
malicious accusation that [the employer] bribed or improperly
influenced federal officers in the exercise of their official duties[,]”68
and because of this, the employer’s decision to terminate the plaintiff
was lawfully based on the plaintiff’s knowing and malicious libelous
statements.69 The plaintiff argued the statements were protected,
regardless of their truth.70 The lower court found the statements to be
false, but the court was not certain whether the statements were
motivated by malice.71 Regardless, the lower court ruled the
termination was justified.72 As noted earlier, the Fifth Circuit
reversed.73
The Fifth Circuit started by noting the following regarding the
participation clause’s purpose: “In unmistakable language[,] it is to
protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by Congress to
protect his rights. The Act will be frustrated if the employer may
unilaterally determine the truth or falsity of charges and take
independent action.”74 The court also focused on the importance of
allowing employees to file EEOC charges without fear of retaliation.75
The court stated the following:

63. Id.
64. Id. at 1001 n.5.
65. Id. at 1002.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1003.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1003–04.
71. Id. at 1004.
72. Id. The EEOC found the plaintiff’s statements were protected because they were made in
the exercise of his right to complain to the EEOC and to avail himself of the Title VII process. Id.
73. Id. at 1000.
74. Id. at 1005.
75. Id.
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The burden of enforcement rests on the individual through
his suit in Federal District Court. But charges must first have
been filed with EEOC. Consequently, the filing of charges
and the giving of information by employees is essential to the
Commission’s administration of Title VII, the carrying out
of the congressional policy embodied in the Act[,] and the
invocation of the sole sanction of Court compulsion through
employee instituted suit.76
The court noted employee participation was “essential” and
should be protected.77 Relying on NLRB v. Burnup and Sims, Inc.78—
and comparing an employee to David and an employer to Goliath—
the court stated “[a] protected activity acquires a precarious status if
innocent employees can be discharged while engaging in it, even
though the employer acts in good faith.”79 The court also noted that
“protection must be afforded to those who seek the benefit of statutes
designed by Congress to equalize employer and employee in matters
of employment.”80
Realizing there must be a balance between an employer’s right
not to be damaged by “maliciously libelous statements” and an
employee’s right to be free from discrimination, the court struck that
balance in the employee’s favor.81 The court held:
We hold that where, disregarding the malicious material
contained in a charge (or petition for reconsideration, or other
communication with EEOC sufficient for EEOC purposes, or
in a proceeding before EEOC) the charge otherwise satisfies
the liberal requirements of a charge, the charging party is
exercising a protected right under the Act. He may not be
discharged for such writing. The employer may not take it on
itself to determine the correctness or consequences of it. Nor
may the court either sustain any employer disciplinary action
or deny relief because of the presence of such malicious
material.82

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
379 U.S. 21 (1964).
Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1005 (quoting Burnup, 379 U.S. at 23).
Id. at 1006.
Id. at 1007.
Id.
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The court then concluded the plaintiff’s communication with the
EEOC was protected even though there was material that was
probably false and/or malicious.83 Elaborating, the court noted a
plaintiff is not “stripped of . . . protection” because of those
allegations, and as long as the plaintiff “says enough,” he cannot be
subjected to retaliation.84 Because the employee was terminated
because of the contents of the communication with the EEOC, the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.85
The Fourth Circuit has also acknowledged the participation
clause’s protection is very broad.86 In Glover v. South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division,87 the plaintiff was fired after giving deposition
testimony in another individual’s EEO proceeding.88 The problem,
from the employer’s perspective, was that the plaintiff’s testimony
was not only unrelated to the other employee’s case, but it was also
critical of the office for which the plaintiff had worked prior to her
employment with the defendant.89 The plaintiff accused her previous
employer of mismanagement, destruction of documents, inappropriate
behavior, and discrimination.90 This testimony was not related to the
case for which the plaintiff was being deposed, and when the “target”
of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony heard about it, he reported it to
the plaintiff’s then-current employer.91 Soon thereafter, the plaintiff
was removed from her position, and one of the reasons given was that
her deposition testimony “demonstrated poor judgment.”92

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1007–08.
86. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). Although the court
provided broad protection, it did state it was not answering whether a charge must be filed in good
faith to receive protection. Id. at 415 n.2. In a pre-Glover, unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit
relied on Pettway and stated, “While we may sympathize with the employer having to deal with an
employee who has made conflicting and contradictory statements in an important investigation, the
employee is protected from discharge because of his statements if they are made in connection with
an investigation, proceeding or hearing under Title VII.” Arvinger v. Mayor of Balt. City, No. 882203, 1990 WL 2198, at *8 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1990).
87. 170 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999).
88. Id. at 412. Although Glover involved a plaintiff who testified in another employee’s
lawsuit (and did not file her own EEOC charge), both activities fall under the participation clause
and should receive the same level of protection. Id. at 413–14.
89. Id. at 412.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 413.
92. Id.
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The plaintiff filed a retaliation claim, and the district court granted
the employer’s motion for summary judgment.93 The court decided the
employer terminated the plaintiff because of her testimony, but that
her testimony was not protected because it was “unresponsive,
uncompelled, and gratuitous.”94 Therefore, because of the substance
of the plaintiff’s testimony, the lower court decided she had not
engaged in protected activity.95
On appeal, the defendant asked the court to apply a
reasonableness test when analyzing participation activities, which is
what that court had done when analyzing opposition activities.96 The
defendant also asked the court to find the plaintiff’s testimony
unreasonable and therefore not protected.97 The court rejected the
invitation to adopt a reasonableness test for participation activities,
basing this decision on both the text and purpose of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.98
With respect to Title VII’s text, the court noted the following:
“Reading a reasonableness test into . . . [the] participation clause
would do violence to the text of that provision and would undermine
the objectives of Title VII.”99 Elaborating on the statutory language,
the court stated:
The plain language of the participation clause itself
forecloses us from improvising such a reasonableness test.
The clause forbids retaliation against an employee who “has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner” in a protected proceeding. [The plaintiff] was fired
because she “testified” in a Title VII deposition. The term
“testify” has a plain meaning: “[t]o bear witness” or “to give
evidence as a witness.”100
Because the statutory language in no way limited protection, the
court was unwilling to read limiting language into it.101

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id. (first quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); and then quoting Testify, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (6th ed.1990)).
101. Id.
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Next, relying on Pettway, the court noted participation plaintiffs
are afforded “exceptionally broad protection.”102 And when referring
back to Title VII’s language, the court noted there is nothing in that
language that limits the participation clause’s reach; in fact, the court
believed Congress’s use of the phrase “in any manner” demonstrated
just the opposite—that the participation clause’s protection “is meant
to sweep broadly.”103 Wrapping up its analysis of the statutory
language, the court noted: “Congress could not have carved out in
clearer terms this safe harbor from employer retaliation. A
straightforward reading of the statute’s unrestrictive language leads
inexorably to the conclusion that all testimony in a Title VII
proceeding is protected against punitive employer action.”104
Next, the court addressed the participation clause’s purpose,
which is to “[m]aintain[] unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms.”105 Because participation is critical to Title VII’s
enforcement, individuals must be comfortable participating in the
enforcement process.106 The court noted: “If a witness in a Title VII
proceeding were secure from retaliation only when her testimony met
some slippery reasonableness standard, she would surely be less than
forth-coming. It follows that the application vel non of the
participation clause should not turn on the substance of the
testimony.”107
The court then cited Pettway again, noting that “[a] protected
activity acquires a precarious status if innocent employees can be
discharged while engaging in it, even though the employer acts in
good faith.”108 Concluding that point, the court noted “Congress has
determined that some irrelevant and even provocative testimony must
be immunized so that Title VII proceedings will not be chilled. It is
not for this court to overturn that judgment.”109
Next, the court addressed the employer’s argument that such a
broad interpretation would prevent an employer from ever terminating
102. Id. (quoting Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 n.18 (5th Cir. 1969)).
103. Id. (first quoting Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997); and
then citing United States v. Wildes, 120 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 1997)).
104. Id. As noted earlier, the participation clause covers EEOC charges as well as testimony
given during a Title VII proceeding. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018).
105. Glover, 170 F.3d at 414 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969)).
109. Id.
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an employee who participates in EEO activity.110 The court rejected
that argument, observing that employers can still fire employees who
participate in EEO proceedings; they simply cannot fire those
employees because they participate in those proceedings.111
Employers can still discipline employees, so long as their motive is
not a retaliatory one.112 The court held: “[w]e merely hold, in
accordance with the statute’s specific text, that an employer may not
fire an employee because of her testimony in a Title VII
proceeding.”113
The court then addressed the defendant’s additional arguments,
but it rejected all of them.114 The court opined that imposing a
reasonableness standard (1) “would lead the federal courts into a
morass of collateral litigation in employment discrimination cases”;
(2) would make witnesses unwilling to provide accurate information
during depositions; and (3) would lead to discovery disputes that
would ultimately waste individual and judicial resources.115
Finally, the court distinguished the cases upon which the
employer relied.116 The court did so by noting those cases involved the
opposition clause rather than the participation clause, and that “the
scope of protection for activity falling under the participation clause is
broader than for activity falling under the opposition clause.”117
According to the court, the “unambiguous and specific” language of
the participation clause does not require any balancing and provides
extremely broad protection.118 After rejecting the defendant’s other
arguments (for reasons not relevant to this Article), the court reversed
and remanded.119
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Jackson v. St. Joseph State Hosp., 840 F.2d 1387, 1390–91 (8th Cir. 1988)).
113. Id. at 414–15.
114. Id. at 415.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th Cir.
1998)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 415–16. Judge Williams argued that once the plaintiff started the attacks unrelated
to the pending litigation, she was no longer protected. Id. at 416 (Williams, J., dissenting). Since
Glover, at least one court within the Fourth Circuit expressed its belief the Fourth Circuit would
reject a reasonableness standard for participation activities. See Mezu v. Morgan State Univ., No.
WMN-09-2855, 2013 WL 3934013, at *10–11 (D. Md. July 29, 2013) (expressing its belief that
“the Fourth Circuit would follow the clear majority rule and not require participation clause
plaintiffs to establish reasonable belief in the merits of their underlying charge or complaint”).
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Another case supporting broad protection for participation
activity is Wyatt v. City of Boston.120 In Wyatt, the plaintiff alleged his
former employer retaliated against him for opposing what he thought
was sex discrimination and for filing a charge with the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination (the state equivalent of the
EEOC).121 The lower court dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a claim, but the First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded.122
Although the First Circuit was unsure regarding the nature of the
complaint, it concluded the plaintiff was alleging Title VII
retaliation.123
Although courts have relied on Wyatt for the proposition that the
participation clause provides almost unlimited protection,124 the
opinion provides only thin analysis.125 Specifically, the court first
noted the difference between opposition activity and participation
activity, and while addressing participation activity, the court stated
the following: “there is nothing in [the participation clause’s] wording
requiring that the charges be valid, nor even an implied requirement
that they be reasonable.”126 The First Circuit relied on Sias v. City
Demonstration Agency127 and on Pettway, as well as on Larson’s
employment discrimination treatise.128 Ultimately, the court
determined the plaintiff could, possibly, prove facts that would allow
recovery, and therefore, the lower court had erroneously dismissed the
complaint.129
The Eleventh Circuit has also opined, at least in passing, that the
participation clause’s reach is very broad.130 Although ultimately
deciding the employee engaged in opposition activity, the court in
Total System Services, Inc., noted the following: “[e]ven if false
statements made in the context of an EEOC charge (per the
participation clause) are protected and cannot be grounds for dismissal
120. 35 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994).
121. Id. at 14.
122. Id. at 14, 16.
123. Id. at 14–16.
124. See, e.g., Booth v. Pasco Cnty., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1201 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
125. See Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15–16.
126. Id. at 15.
127. 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978).
128. Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15–16.
129. Id.
130. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174–76 (11th
Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001).
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or discipline, this extreme level of protection for untruth is not
afforded to false statements made under the opposition clause.”131
When addressing the difference between participation and opposition,
the court noted the participation clause’s broad level of protection:
The statutory retaliation provision has two distinct
components. Both offer employees some protection, but that
these two components should offer two different levels of
protection is consistent with the plain reading and purposes
of the statute. The participation clause includes activity done
in connection with proceedings conducted by the federal
government and its agencies: an employee has invoked the
jurisdiction of the federal government through its agency, the
EEOC. And we have held that expansive protection is
available for these adjudicative kinds of proceedings run by
the government.132
Thus, even though the plaintiff ultimately lost, the court did
emphasize the participation clause’s broad protection.133
Another court that emphasized the participation clause’s breadth
was the Tenth Circuit.134 In Vaughn, the court rejected the limited
interpretation the employer suggested and decided the plaintiff
engaged in protected activity when she disclosed unredacted
documents to the EEOC, which violated company policy and also
possibly state and federal law.135 Unfortunately for the plaintiff,
however, the court also decided her actions constituted a legitimate,
non-retaliatory reason for her discharge,136 and because the plaintiff

131. Id. at 1175 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (first citing Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969); and then citing Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113
(9th Cir. 1990)).
132. Id. at 1175–76 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007).
133. Id.; see also Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir.
1989) (agreeing with Pettway that the participation clause provides broad protections) (involving
state equivalent to Title VII).
134. See Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2008).
135. Id. at 1152, 1153 n.4.
136. Id. at 1154. The court acknowledged that although participation is almost always
protected, the employer can terminate the employee for that activity if it violates a company rule.
Id. at 1152 n.3. The court noted:
Although the participation clause may be nearly absolute in theory, it may seldom be
absolute in fact. When an employee violates an employer’s policies, or for that matter
the law, it will often be the case that the employer can assert a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for taking an adverse employment action against the employee. And unless the
employee can show that this reason was a pretext for retaliation, the employee will fail
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could not prove pretext, the court affirmed the defendant’s summary
judgment.137
United States District Courts have also addressed the
participation clause’s breadth.138 For example, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled in favor of an
employee who brought a retaliation claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.139 In Calhoun v. EPS Corp.,140 the
plaintiff’s employer terminated her fifteen days after she filed a
“meritless EEO complaint.”141 The EEOC found reasonable cause to
believe the plaintiff was retaliated against for challenging the
employer’s discriminatory practices, and that “retaliatory animus was
the primary motivating factor for [her] discharge.”142
After addressing the plaintiff’s substantive ADEA claim, the
court addressed her retaliation claim.143 The court acknowledged this
case presented a strange occurrence—an employment discrimination
case in which the plaintiff prevails on a motion for summary
judgment.144 The reason for this outcome was the direct evidence of
retaliation—the employer conceded it terminated the plaintiff because
she filed the EEO complaint.145 The employer believed the plaintiff
knowingly filed a false complaint, and because of this, the employer
believed it could terminate her for exercising bad judgment, violating

to meet her burden under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Indeed,
such a circumstance occurs in this case.
Id. Thus, even though the plaintiff proved she engaged in protected activity, the court found that
activity to be an acceptable reason for her termination. Id. at 1153–54.
137. Id. at 1155. For another case that adopted a broad view of the participation clause, see
Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000).
138. See infra discussion remaining in Section III.A.
139. Calhoun v. EPS Corp., 36 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2014), vacated in part, No.
13-cv-2954, 2014 WL 12799080 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014). ADEA retaliation cases are analyzed
the same way as Title VII retaliation cases. See, e.g., Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d
462, 465 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We approach [the plaintiff’s] age-based retaliatory discharge claim in the
same way as retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”).
140. 36 F. Supp. 3d 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2014), vacated in part, No. 13-cv-2954, 2014 WL
12799080 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014).
141. Id. at 1348–49.
142. Id. at 1349.
143. Id. at 1353.
144. Id. at 1354. The court later granted the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, deciding a
genuine issue of material fact existed. Calhoun v. EPS Corp., No. 13-cv-2954, 2014 WL 12799080,
at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014). Nonetheless, on reconsideration, the court noted the participation
clause grants “near-absolute” protection. Id.
145. Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1354–55.
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company policy regarding filing accurate reports, and risking the loss
of a government contract.146 The court rejected this position.147
After addressing the evidence of retaliation, the court addressed
the protection afforded by the statute.148 The court first noted “making
an EEO complaint is absolutely protected activity.”149 It also
mentioned that “[e]ven filing a false EEO complaint is protected
conduct.”150 Relying on Pettway, the court noted the participation
clause’s protection is “nearly absolute.”151 The court also relied on the
Second Circuit’s statement in Deravin v. Kerik152 that the participation
clause “is expansive and seemingly contains no limitations.”153
Finally, relying on Total Systems Services, Inc., the court stated:
“Importantly, that near-absolute protection covers even false
complaints. As the Eleventh Circuit has held: even ‘false statements
made in the context of an EEOC charge . . . are protected and cannot
be grounds for dismissal or discipline . . . .’”154 Thus, the court
adopted a broad interpretation of the participation clause, and
consistent with Pettway, the court was unwilling to allow the employer
to determine the merits of the employee’s EEO complaint.155
The court then relied on the EEOC Compliance Manual.156 It
quoted the following passage from the Manual:
The anti-discrimination statutes do not limit or condition in
any way the protection against retaliation for participating in
the charge process. While the opposition clause applies only
to those who protest practices that they reasonably and in
good faith believe are unlawful, the participation clause
applies to all individuals who participate in the statutory
complaint process. Thus, courts have consistently held that a
respondent is liable for retaliating against an individual for
filing an EEOC charge regardless of the validity or
146. Id. at 1354.
147. Id. at 1354–61.
148. Id. at 1356.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 n.18 (5th Cir. 1969)).
152. 335 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2003).
153. Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (citing Deravin, 335 F.3d at 203).
154. Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs.,
Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1356–57.
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reasonableness of the charge. To permit an employer to
retaliate against a charging party based on its unilateral
determination that the charge was unreasonable or
otherwise unjustified would chill the rights of all individuals
protected by the anti-discrimination statutes.157
And after concluding that the plaintiff’s EEO complaint was
analogous to an EEOC charge, the court decided she would receive
protection.158 The court rejected the employer’s invitation to use a
reasonable, good-faith-belief test, concluding such a test applies only
to opposition cases.159 As a result of this legal conclusion and direct
evidence of retaliation, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment.160 Only the issue of damages remained.161
Another district court opinion providing broad protection under
the participation clause comes from the District of Columbia.162 Egei
v. Johnson163 involved a plaintiff who filed false sexual harassment
charges.164 The court framed the issue as being “whether an employer
may lawfully fire an employee for making false or malicious
accusations during the course of Equal Employment Opportunity
(‘EEO’) proceedings.”165 The court decided the answer was “no,” and
that the participation clause protects employees who engage in this
activity.166 In denying the employer’s motion to dismiss (or in the
alternative, summary judgment), the court stated “Title VII’s
participation clause protects an employee from adverse employment
action taken on the basis of the substance of her testimony in a Title
VII EEO proceeding.”167

157. Id. at 1357 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II(C)(2) (1998)). Other courts have also relied on the EEOC’s position.
See, e.g., Wesolowski v. Napolitano, No. CV 211-163, 2013 WL 1286207, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 25,
2013) (“Additionally, the EEOC Compliance Manual makes a clear distinction between opposition
and participation, requiring a reasonable good-faith belief for the former and explicitly not requiring
that for the latter.”).
158. Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1357.
159. Id. at 1359–60.
160. Id. at 1360–61.
161. Id. at 1363; see supra note 144.
162. See Egei v. Johnson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D.D.C. 2016).
163. 192 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D.D.C. 2016).
164. Id. at 82.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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The plaintiff’s initial claim was that she was harassed by a
supervisor and that she was “right-sized” because she refused to
engage in sexual activities with him.168 At her EEO hearing, she
testified inconsistently with her prior statements, and her employer
proved those statements were false.169 As a result, the ALJ ruled the
plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case, the alleged incidents
did not happen, and the alleged events were not based on any
prohibited reasons.170
Approximately one and a half years after this decision, the
plaintiff was terminated, and it is this termination upon which the
plaintiff based her retaliation complaint.171 The plaintiff claimed she
was terminated because of her prior EEO activity, a claim supported
by her former employer’s statement that she was, in fact, terminated
as a result of her earlier complaint and testimony.172 In fact, the
plaintiff’s termination letter stated that “[t]he falsification of records,
inaccurate statements and lack of candor [constituted] unacceptable
behavior which [would] not be tolerated or condoned.”173
The plaintiff filed a pro se complaint, alleging retaliation.174 In
addressing the defendant’s motion to dismiss (or, in the alternative,
summary judgment), the court framed the issue as being “[w]hether,
as a matter of law, an employee may be subject to an adverse
employment action on the basis of false or malicious statements made
during the course of equal employment proceedings.”175
After identifying the relevant statutory provision, the court noted
the very different interpretations each party had regarding that
provision.176 The plaintiff’s argument was simple—she was
terminated because of her earlier EEO charge (and because of the
testimony she provided in support of that charge), and Title VII
prohibits such a termination.177 Predictably, the defendant had a
different opinion—that it fired the plaintiff because she lied during the

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 82–83.
Id. at 83–84.
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 85–86.
Id. at 85.
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EEO process, not because she filed a charge or testified regarding it.178
The employer argued that while Title VII protects employees from
filing charges and testifying regarding those charges, the statute does
not protect false or malicious statements made during the EEO
process.179
The court noted the split of authority, with some courts deciding
employees are protected after engaging in this type of behavior, and
other courts concluding employees lose protection under these
circumstances.180 The court noted the D.C. Circuit had not yet
addressed the issue, but that court had noted in dicta that the
participation clause provides significant protection, and that its
language “speaks in clear, absolute terms.”181 The court then restated
the question before it—“whether the participation clause shields an
employee from adverse action on the basis of any testimony she
provides in an EEO proceeding . . . or whether the privilege [is] . . . a
qualified one.”182
The court looked at Pettway and at cases that followed it.183
Included in this review was the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Glover,
where the court observed that “all testimony in a Title VII proceeding
is protected against punitive employer action.”184 As noted earlier, the
Glover decision was based partially on the anti-retaliation provision’s
language, which does not include limits on the participation clause’s
scope; in fact, the statutory language suggests the protection is very
broad.185 Quoting Glover, the court in Egei stated:
Section 704(a)’s protections ensure not only that employers
cannot intimidate their employees into for[ ]going the Title
178. Id. at 86.
179. Id.
180. Id. The court cited to two pro-employee cases, Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411
(4th Cir. 1999), and Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969), and to one
pro-employer case, Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 2004), to demonstrate the
split on this issue. Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 86.
181. Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 86 (quoting Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019
(D.C. Cir. 1981)).
182. Id. at 86–87.
183. Id. at 87–88.
184. Id. at 87 (quoting Glover, 170 F.3d at 414). The other cases Egei cited were:
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000),
reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879
F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 266, 268 (3d Cir.
2006); Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999); and Wyatt v. City of
Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994). Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 88.
185. See supra Section II.
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VII grievance process, but also that investigators will have
access to the unchilled testimony of witnesses. . . . If a
witness in a Title VII proceeding were secure from retaliation
only when her testimony met some slippery reasonableness
standard, she would surely be less than forthcoming. It
follows that the application vel non of the participation clause
should not turn on the substance of the testimony.186
The court then noted many courts had adopted Pettway, and that
the rule from Pettway does not apply to the “less protective”
opposition clause.187
Before deciding which interpretation it would adopt, the court
addressed the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of Pettway.188 The reasons
that court gave for rejecting Pettway were the following: “an employee
could immunize his unreasonable and malicious” complaints by filing
them with a government agency; and the belief that “the panels in
Pettway and similar cases’ [couldn’t] actually believe that forging
documents and coercing witnesses to give false testimony are
protected conduct.’”189
The court in Egei thus noted that at the time of its opinion, the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits adopted the employee-friendly Pettway rule,
while the Seventh Circuit had rejected it.190 The court also noted that
the other courts that had addressed this issue, including the D.C.
Circuit, had either tacitly approved of Pettway or had commented on
the participation clause’s broad protection.191 The court then decided
it would follow Pettway.192
The court based its conclusion first on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion
in Parker.193 Specifically, when addressing the participation clause,
that court noted the clause “speaks in clear, absolute terms, and has
accordingly been interpreted as shielding recourse to the EEOC,
regardless of the ultimate resolution of the underlying claim on the

186. Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 87–88 (quoting Glover, 170 F.3d at 414).
187. Id. at 88. See supra note 184 for the cases upon which the Egei court relied.
188. Id.
189. Id. (first quoting Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891; and then quoting Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med.
Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted)).
190. Id. The court also noted there were conflicting opinions on this issue within the Eighth
Circuit. Id. at 88 n.4.
191. Id. at 88.
192. Id. at 88–89.
193. Id. at 89.
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merits.”194 Realizing Congress’s goal was to protect employees who
speak out against employers, the court noted a limited interpretation
would chill employees’ willingness to file charges and would thus
defeat the goal of combatting discrimination.195 Because the D.C.
Circuit recognized the problems of limiting protection and had
favorably cited to Pettway, Egei concluded affording broad protection
was consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s position.196
The second reason the court protected the plaintiff’s behavior was
the anti-retaliation provision’s language.197 The language on which the
court relied was the part of the participation clause that protects
employees who “ha[ve] . . . participated in any manner” in an EEO
proceeding.198 According to the court, and relying on Glover, “[a]
straightforward reading of the statute’s unrestrictive language leads
inexorably to the conclusion that all testimony in a Title VII
proceeding” is protected.199The court also noted the Seventh Circuit’s
pro-employer interpretation was not based on statutory language, but
rather on the belief Congress could not have intended such an
employee-friendly result.200
The third reason the court gave was that a broad interpretation
was consistent with the purpose behind Title VII, and that “[a]ctivities
under the participation clause are essential to the machinery set up by
Title VII.”201 Such activities would be “chilled,” and Title VII’s
enforcement scheme would be frustrated, if employees could be
terminated if they were unable to prove their claims.202 In fact,
employees would be dissuaded from filing charges if they knew they
could be terminated if their charge was not proven.203
The court acknowledged the difference between mistaken claims
of discrimination (ones that should be protected) and false claims
(ones that perhaps should not be protected), but acknowledged that it
194. Id. (quoting Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
195. Id. (quoting Parker, 652 F.2d at 1019).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018)).
199. Id. (quoting Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999)).
200. Id. (quoting Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2010)).
201. Id. at 89 (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1998)).
202. Id. at 89–90 (quoting Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1005, 1019 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)).
203. Id. at 90.
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is very difficult to distinguish between the two.204 And because of that
difficulty, providing protection for one, but not the other, would result
in employees being unwilling to file charges.205 The court stated the
following:
A good-faith but mistaken claim of discrimination, of course,
is not the same as a false claim of discrimination, and those
judges who have rejected the Pettway rule have emphasized
that the two can be distinguished. This might be true in a case
where an employee admits to having lied. But absent such an
admission, the risk of chilling legitimate claims and
testimony remains. It would be cold comfort for claimants if
they were nominally protected from adverse action on the
basis of their testimony, but only to the extent that a judge,
an ALJ, or even an employer concludes in “good faith” that
such testimony was false or malicious.206
This possibility, which would deter employees from coming
forward as victims or as witnesses, was the third reason the court gave
a broad interpretation to the participation clause.207
The final reason the court gave for adopting this approach was
that doing so was consistent with protections afforded to other
plaintiffs.208 Analogizing to tort law, the court noted that individuals
are absolutely privileged to make defamatory statements during those
proceedings, and the court believed that because the purpose of such
privilege is necessary to provide access to legal remedies, EEO
complainants should be granted similar protection.209 Although
protecting false testimony certainly has its drawbacks, the court
weighed the advantages and disadvantages of that approach and
concluded:
This is not to condone lying or to suggest that false charges
and testimony do not take a toll on administrative
proceedings. The problem is that, in practice, it is not
possible to permit employers to take adverse action against
EEO claimants based on false charges or testimony—or
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 89–90.
Id. at 90.
Id.
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based on charges and testimony that the employer believes to
be false—without chilling truthful charges and testimony.210
The court then decided to tip the balance in favor of providing
protection for employees.211
The court did acknowledge there were legitimate arguments on
the other side of this issue (including the possibility that employees
will make more false and defamatory charges), and the court also
limited its holding in three ways, including the limitation it placed on
intentionally false and malicious statements.212 Specifically, the court
questioned whether its interpretation would apply to that situation:
Second, this is not a case in which an employee has admitted
having made a false or malicious statement in the course of
an EEO proceeding. The question whether such an admission
would render a false or malicious statement actionable under
Title VII, once again, is not before the Court; the question
before the Court is simply whether an employer may punish
an employee for offering testimony in an EEO proceeding
that the employee asserts is true and that the employer
disbelieves.213
This limitation is, of course, the focus of this Article, and it is
possible the court would not reach the same result in a case where it is
clear the employee intentionally filed a false charge or provided false
testimony.214
One other court that adopted a broad interpretation of the
participation clause was the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida.215 Booth v. Pasco County216 involved two
plaintiffs; the first plaintiff alleged retaliation based on his filing of
union grievances and EEOC charges, and the second plaintiff alleged
retaliation after he was listed as a witness by the first plaintiff.217 After

210. Id.
211. Id. at 90–91.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 91.
214. If, however, the court wants to protect knowingly false and malicious statements, it could
rely on Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 977–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), which decided those
statements were protected.
215. See Booth v. Pasco Cnty., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1199 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
216. 829 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
217. Id. at 1186.
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addressing preliminary issues, the court addressed whether the
plaintiffs engaged in protected activity.218
The defendant presented several reasons it believed the charges
were not protected, including the argument that the charges were
unreasonable and made in bad faith.219 The court rejected this
argument.220 First, the court correctly concluded that filing a charge
qualifies as participation activity.221 The court then noted that although
the reasonable, good-faith-belief standard applies to opposition
activity, the parties disputed whether that standard applied to
participation activity.222 The court decided the participation clause
does not require the same reasonable, good-faith-belief standard.223
First, the court acknowledged two recent cases within the
Eleventh Circuit that raised this question but did not answer it.224 The
court also noted there was a circuit split on the issue, with more
circuits deciding not to utilize a reasonable, good-faith-belief
standard.225 The union had asked the court to adopt the Seventh
Circuit’s approach in Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc.,226 in which the court
ruled in favor of the employer after it presented strong evidence the
plaintiff’s charges were filed in bad faith and with a malicious
purpose.227 The court in Mattson adopted the reasonable, good-faithbelief standard and rejected the plaintiff’s participation claim, and the
defendant in Booth wanted this court to do the same.228 The court
refused to do so, noting the following regarding Pettway:

218. Id. at 1198.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1199–201.
221. Id. at 1199.
222. Id. at 1199–200.
223. Id. at 1200.
224. Id. (first citing Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1998);
and then citing Soto v. Bank of Am., No. 04-CV-782-ORL28JGG, 2005 WL 2861116, at *10 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 1, 2005)). In 2007, a court within the Eleventh Circuit rejected a good-faith requirement.
See Holmes v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:06-CV-2556-CC-AJB, 2007 WL 9650147, at *42
n.54 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 2007). More recently, a different court within the Eleventh Circuit followed
Pettway and rejected limiting the participation clause. See Rodabaugh v. Regions Bank, No. 18CV-216, 2020 WL 1812299, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 9, 2020) (“But the Court will not apply the
objective reasonableness requirement to [the plaintiff’s] participation clause argument because the
Court believes that is most consistent with Pettway . . . .”).
225. Booth, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
226. 359 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 2004).
227. Id. at 889–90. The Booth court noted that unlike in Mattson, the evidence did not support
a finding of malicious intent. Booth, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 n.18.
228. Id. at 1200.
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Given these and other considerations, the Court ultimately
declined to make the protections given to an EEOC charge
contingent on the contents of that charge, and held that such
a charge would be protected even if it contained false, and/or
malicious contents. Thus, the Court declined to read a good
faith and reasonableness requirement into the protections
afforded to the participation clause.229
The Booth court also noted the majority of courts that had
addressed this issue had not incorporated the reasonable, good-faithbelief test into participation cases.230 In reaching its decision, the court
relied on the following cases in addition to Pettway: Wyatt; Slagle v.
County of Clarion;231 Johnson v. University of Cincinnati;232 and
Glover.233 Based on the reasoning in those cases, the court in Booth
rejected a heightened standard for participation cases, and it concluded
the plaintiffs engaged in protected activity.234
The opinions addressed in this Section, although not all
specifically adopting the position that all participation activity is
protected, certainly provide authority for a very broad interpretation
of the participation clause. Not all courts, however, have adopted such
a plaintiff-friendly approach.235 The next Section will discuss cases in
229. Id. at 1200–01 (citation omitted).
230. Id. at 1201.
231. 435 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2006). The Slagle court also relied on the EEOC Compliance
Manual, which stated plaintiffs are protected regardless of whether their EEOC charges are valid
or reasonable. Id. at 268. Since Slagle, the Third Circuit appears to have changed its position. See
Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v.
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) for the following proposition: “Whether the employee opposes,
or participates in a proceeding against, the employer’s activity, the employee must hold an
objectively reasonable belief, in good faith, that the activity they oppose is unlawful under Title
VII.” (emphasis added)).
232. 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000). Prior to Johnson, the court addressed an analogous state-law
retaliation claim and relied heavily on Pettway. See Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,
879 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1989). In Booker, the court noted:
The “exceptionally broad protection” of the participation clause extends to persons who
have “participated in any manner” in Title VII proceedings. Protection is not lost if the
employee is wrong on the merits of the charge, nor is protection lost if the contents of
the charge are malicious and defamatory as well as wrong. Thus, once the activity in
question is found to be within the scope of the participation clause, the employee is
generally protected from retaliation.
Id. at 1312 (citations omitted).
233. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999).
234. Booth, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 1201; see also Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 977–
79 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (assuming that the plaintiff’s statements were false and malicious but deciding
that the participation clause protected them).
235. See infra Section III.B.
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which the court was unwilling to provide such broad protection for
employees seeking protection under the participation clause.
B. Courts that Have Taken a Pro-Employer Position
Not surprisingly, some courts have decided the participation
clause’s protections do not extend to plaintiffs who knowingly engage
in false participation activity.236 Despite acknowledging the
participation clause’s broad language, these courts believe that
Congress could not have intended to protect these individuals; that
doing so would have the effect of providing job security for bad
employees;237 and that the Supreme Court’s Breeden opinion applies
to the participation clause.238 Some of these pro-employer cases will
now be discussed.
One of the most commonly cited opinions for the proposition that
the participation clause does not protect false charges is Mattson.
Unlike some of the cases discussed previously, this case squarely
addressed whether knowingly filing false EEOC charges is
protected.239 The court decided it is not.240 In Mattson, the plaintiff
filed a charge with the EEOC and with Illinois’s equivalent state
agency.241 The charge was based on minor incidents between the
plaintiff and his supervisor, incidents in which he alleged his
supervisor engaged in physical contact with him.242 These allegations
had previously been investigated internally, with the conclusion being
that the plaintiff’s complaint was meritless.243
Three months after that internal investigation, the plaintiff filed
the charge with the EEOC and the equivalent state agency.244 After
conducting a second internal investigation and concluding that not
236. See, e.g., Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 892 (7th Cir. 2004).
237. Id. at 891; see also Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“[P]articipation doesn’t insulate an employee from being discharged for conduct that, if it occurred
outside an investigation, would warrant termination.”); Gilooly v. Mo. Dep’t of Health & Senior
Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 740 (8th Cir. 2005) (highlighting that employees cannot lie and file false
charges without suffering repercussions because “[t]o do so would leave employers with no ability
to fire employees for defaming other employees or the employer through their complaint when the
allegations are without any basis in fact”).
238. See, e.g., Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891–92.
239. Id. at 889–92.
240. Id. at 892.
241. Id. at 888.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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only did no harassment take place, but that the plaintiff made the
accusations to retaliate against his supervisor, the employer fired the
plaintiff.245 This gave rise to the retaliation claim.246 The district court
granted summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.247 The district
court based its opinion on the plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate a
retaliatory motive, but the Seventh Circuit focused its attention on
whether the plaintiff had engaged in protected activity.248 The court
concluded he had not.249
The court first concluded the harassment charge was “both
objectively and subjectively unreasonable, as well as made with the
bad faith purpose of retaliating against his female supervisor.”250
Despite this finding, the plaintiff argued he was protected under the
participation clause because, unlike the opposition clause, the
participation clause does not impose a reasonable, good-faith-belief
standard.251 The plaintiff relied on several opinions for this
argument,252 but the court rejected it because “none of [the plaintiff’s]
cases actually involved a plaintiff who filed unreasonable charges, let
alone charges that were both unreasonable and made in bad faith.”253
The case the Seventh Circuit believed was most supportive of the
plaintiff’s position was Pettway, but even that case was unable to save
the plaintiff.254 The court distinguished Pettway by noting that
although the substance of the Pettway plaintiff’s allegations was false,
there was no evidence the Pettway plaintiff was “motivated by
malice.”255 The court also distinguished Pettway by noting the
allegations in that case were not baseless, unlike those before the court
in Mattson.256 When wrapping up its discussion of Pettway, the court
noted the following:
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 888–92.
249. Id. at 891–92.
250. Id. at 889.
251. Id.
252. The cases upon which the plaintiff relied were Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215
F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1980); Booker v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); and Pettway v. Am. Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969). Mattson, 359 F.3d at 889–90.
253. Id. at 890.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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This stands in stark contrast to Mattson’s charges, which as
already discussed did not objectively state a claim of sexual
harassment. Furthermore, there is evidence that Mattson’s
claim was filed maliciously. Thus, Pettway does not persuade
this Court that employees should receive Title VII protection
for filing unreasonable charges in bad faith.257
After distinguishing Pettway and other cases upon which the
plaintiff relied,258 the court cited cases from the Seventh Circuit and
concluded that “utterly baseless” claims did not receive protection.259
The court observed why it was appropriate to include a reasonableness
requirement and a good-faith requirement in participation cases:
The purpose of requiring that plaintiffs reasonably believe in
good faith that they have suffered discrimination is clear.
Title VII was designed to protect the rights of employees who
in good faith protest the discrimination they believe they
have suffered and to ensure that such employees remain free
from reprisals or retaliatory conduct. Title VII was not
designed to “arm employees with a tactical coercive weapon”
under which employees can make baseless claims simply to
“advance their own retaliatory motives and strategies.”260
The court acknowledged the Seventh Circuit had not yet approved
the “utterly baseless” standard for participation cases, but it also noted
the court had not limited that standard only to opposition cases.261 It
then stated the same standard should apply to all retaliation cases.262
The court gave the following reasons for applying the same standard
to all of these cases: (1) without adopting the same standard, an
employee could “immunize” an unreasonable and malicious internal
complaint by making the same allegations with a government agency;
(2) an employee could give himself “unlimited tenure” by filing
numerous EEOC charges before the employer realizes the internal
allegations were false and malicious; and (3) such a standard “would
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. The cases upon which the court relied were Fine v. Ryan International Airlines, 305
F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996); and Dey
v. Colt Construction & Development Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1458 (7th Cir. 1994). Mattson, 359 F.3d
at 890.
260. Id. (quoting Spadola v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 242 F. Supp. 2d 284, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
261. Id. at 890–91.
262. Id. at 891.
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encourage the abuse of Title VII and the proceedings that it
establishes.”263
Finally, the court addressed the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Breeden, which rejected a plaintiff’s opposition claim because her
belief she was the victim of sexual harassment was unreasonable.264
Although acknowledging Breeden involved opposition, Mattson
applied Breeden to this participation case.265 The court explained this
in the following manner:
While we acknowledge that the Supreme Court did not apply
the reasonableness requirement in a participation clause
context, the Supreme Court also did not hold that the
reasonableness requirement only applies to the opposition
clause. Because the Supreme Court did not distinguish
between opposition and participation claims, we also decline
to do so and hold that the good faith, reasonableness
requirement applies to all Title VII claims.266
Thus, the Seventh Circuit read into the participation clause a
reasonableness requirement even though Breeden did not address that
specific issue (nor did it have a reason to do so).267
The court then stated it was not setting a high bar for plaintiffs
seeking participation-clause protection.268 Employees would still be
protected if they were mistaken on the merits of their charge, and pro
se claimants would still be protected if, despite their best efforts, their
self-drafted complaints did not state a legal claim.269 Nonetheless,

263. Id. The court then distinguished two cases upon which the plaintiff relied: Johnson v.
University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000), and Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141
F.3d 1453 (11th Cir. 1998). Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891. Also see Hatmaker v. Memorial Medical
Center, 619 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2010), where the court relied on Mattson for the proposition
that such a broad interpretation would “encourage the abuse of Title VII and the proceedings that
it established.”
264. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891–92.
265. Id.at 892. For a discussion of Breeden and its application to the participation clause, see
Rosenthal, supra note 46.
266. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 892. Mattson is not the only case to apply Breeden to participation
cases. See Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Breeden, 532
U.S. at 271) (“Whether the employee opposes, or participates in a proceeding against, the
employer’s activity, the employee must hold an objectively reasonable belief, in good faith, that
the activity they oppose is unlawful under Title VII.” (emphasis added)); Rosenthal, supra note 46,
at 365 n.132.
267. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 892.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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here, because the plaintiff’s charge was unreasonable, meritless, and
motivated by malice, the court was unwilling to protect it.270
Another court that appeared to adopt a pro-employer position was
the Eighth Circuit, which did so in Gilooly v. Missouri Department of
Health and Senior Services.271 In Gilooly, an investigator concluded
the plaintiff’s statements made during an investigation into sexual
harassment were not credible and that the plaintiff lied during the
investigatory process.272 The plaintiff was ultimately terminated, at
least in part because of his “deception” during the investigation.273
When addressing whether summary judgment in favor of the employer
was appropriate, the court noted the following:
However, it also cannot be true that a plaintiff can file false
charges, lie to an investigator, and possibly defame coemployees, without suffering repercussions simply because
the investigation was about sexual harassment. To do so
would leave employers with no ability to fire employees for
defaming other employees or the employer through their
complaint when the allegations are without any basis in
fact.274
This statement, however, was made in the context of deciding
whether there was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse
employment action, which occurs after the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case.275 Nonetheless, despite appearing to decide the
plaintiff established a prima facie case, the above-quoted language
provides more limited protection under the participation clause.276
As demonstrated in this Section, courts are not unanimous
regarding whether Title VII protects individuals who knowingly
270. Id. See also Hatmaker v. Memorial Medical Center, 619 F.3d 741, 745–46 (7th Cir. 2010),
where the court relied on Mattson and stated that the participation clause does not provide absolute
protection.
271. 421 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2005).
272. Id. at 737.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 740.
275. Id. Despite appearing to conclude the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the court
indicated it was unwilling to protect knowingly false statements. Id. at 741. In a separate opinion,
Judge Colloton cited Mattson with approval and stated the majority implicitly adopted Mattson. Id.
at 742–43 (Colloton, J., concurring in part). See also Hatmaker, 619 F.3d at 745, which utilized the
language above from Gilooly in deciding Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision does not protect
frivolous accusations.
276. Id. at 739–41. The court then remanded the case because an issue of fact precluded
summary judgment. Id. at 741.
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engage in false participation activities. Although several courts have
protected false statements and allegations, some of those courts were
careful to note they were not directly confronted with knowingly false,
malicious, and/or bad-faith charges and/or testimony.277 The next part
will explain why, even though it might seem distasteful to protect this
type of activity, doing so might be necessary.278
IV. WHY COURTS MIGHT HAVE TO PROTECT KNOWINGLY FALSE
PARTICIPATION ACTIVITIES
Although it might seem odd to protect employees who knowingly
engage in false participation activities, courts might have to do so. This
part explains why protecting these individuals might be a necessary
evil with which employers and courts must live.279 The reasons for this
conclusion include: (A) the participation clause’s broad language; (B)
the EEOC’s position on this issue; (C) the incorrect argument that
providing protection will prevent employers from being able to fire
bad employees; and (D) the purpose of Title VII and the role of the
EEOC.280 These arguments will now be addressed.
A. The Statutory Language Arguably Protects Individuals Who
Knowingly Engage in False Participation Activities
When interpreting a statute, the first place courts must look is to
the statute’s language.281 Several courts that have given a broad
interpretation to the participation clause have done so because of the
very broad language Congress used in the participation clause.282
Specifically, courts have relied on the “or participated in any manner”
language in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision’s participation clause

277. See, e.g., Egei v. Johnson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 81, 91 (D.D.C. 2016).
278. See supra note 9.
279. Although these arguments are based on arguments utilized by courts that addressed false
participation activity, future courts could distinguish some of those cases the way the court in
Mattson did, which is to point out that some of them did not involve false charges made in bad
faith. Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2004).
280. Another reason for protecting these employees is that protecting EEOC complaints, even
those that are malicious or untrue, is “consistent with protections afforded complainants in other
legal regimes.” Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 90.
281. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010); Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
282. See supra Section III.A.
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when providing very broad protection to participation-clause
plaintiffs.283
Because of the “participated in any manner” language Congress
used when describing what the participation clause protects, several
courts have interpreted the statute to mean an employee will be
protected as long as he is engaging in any participation activity.284
Several of the cases discussed earlier relied on this statutory language
when deciding to provide broad protection under the participation
clause.285 For example, the Fifth Circuit in Pettway stated the
following:
There can be no doubt about the purpose of § 704(a). In
unmistakable language it is to protect the employee who
utilizes the tools provided by Congress to protect his rights.
The Act will be frustrated if the employer may unilaterally
determine the truth or falsity of charges and take independent
action.286
Thus, Title VII’s language was one reason why the Pettway court
provided broad protection under the participation clause.287
The Fourth Circuit also addressed the statutory language when it
protected a plaintiff’s unnecessary and unresponsive deposition
testimony in another employee’s EEO case.288 In Glover, the court
assumed the plaintiff’s testimony was unreasonable, but it relied on
Title VII’s language when deciding the testimony was still
protected.289 Relying on that language, the court stated the following:
Reading a reasonableness test into section 704(a)’s
participation clause would do violence to the text of that
provision and would undermine the objectives of Title VII.

283. See, e.g., Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 89 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018)). Some of
the employee-friendly cases that focused on this language were addressed previously, and some of
those cases will also be discussed in this Section.
284. See supra Section III.A and cases cited therein. In addition to the cases that will be
addressed herein, the court in Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
also acknowledged there is a textual argument that supports the proposition that false and malicious
claims are protected.
285. See supra Section III.A and cases cited therein.
286. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004–05 (5th Cir. 1969) (emphasis
added).
287. Id. at 1004–07.
288. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999).
289. Id. at 414–16.
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The plain language of the participation clause itself
forecloses us from improvising such a reasonableness test.
The clause forbids retaliation against an employee who “has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner” in a protected proceeding. Glover was fired because
she “testified” in a Title VII deposition. The term “testify”
has a plain meaning: “[t]o bear witness” or “to give evidence
as a witness.”290
The court then cited to other courts that granted broad protection
under the participation clause, all of which focused on the statutory
language.291 The Glover court observed the activities listed in the
participation clause are “‘not preceded or followed by any restrictive
language that limits its reach.’ In fact, it is followed by the phrase ‘in
any manner’—a clear signal that the provision is meant to sweep
broadly.”292 In wrapping up this point, the court stated “Congress
could not have carved out in clearer terms this safe harbor from
employer retaliation. A straightforward reading of the statute’s
unrestrictive language leads inexorably to the conclusion that all
testimony in a Title VII proceeding is protected against punitive
employer action.”293
Other courts have also relied on the statutory language when
interpreting the participation clause. The First Circuit in Wyatt stated
that under the participation clause, “there is nothing in its wording
requiring that the charges be valid, nor even an implied requirement
that they be reasonable.”294 Although some of these appellate-court
cases might not have specifically involved knowingly false and
290. Id. at 414 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court also
described the participation clause as “unambiguous and specific.” Id. at 415.
291. Id. at 414. The cases upon which the court relied were Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1006 n.18 and
Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997). Id.
292. Glover, 170 F.3d at 414 (citing Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1186). The court in Merritt stated the
following regarding the participation clause: “the adjective ‘any’ is not ambiguous . . . . ‘[It] has an
expansive meaning, that is, “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.”’ . . . ‘[A]ny’ means
all.” Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1186 (citation omitted) (quoting States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)).
293. Glover, 170 F.3d at 414 (emphasis added).
294. Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994). The Eleventh Circuit has also
observed that the statutory language requires different levels of protection for opposition claims
and participation claims. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The statutory retaliation
provision has two distinct components. Both offer employees some protection, but that these two
components should offer two different levels of protection is consistent with the plain reading and
purposes of the statute.”).
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malicious actions, the courts were clear that participation-clause
protection is extremely broad.
United States district courts have also relied on the statutory
language to conclude protection under the participation clause is very
broad. For example, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia relied on Glover when addressing the participation clause’s
language and stated the following:
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he plain language of the
participation clause itself foreclose[d]” a limited
interpretation of its scope. As the court explained, “[t]he
word ‘testified’ is not proceeded [sic] or followed by any
restrictive language that limits its reach”; indeed, “it is
followed by the phrase ‘in any manner’—a clear signal that
the provision is meant to sweep broadly.”295
The court also stated the following regarding the participation
clause’s language:
Second, the text of the participation clause itself militates in
favor of protection for the substance of statements made in
the course of EEO proceedings, even if false or malicious.
As then-Chief Judge Wilkinson observed, the participation
clause forbids retaliation against an employee who “has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner” in a protected proceeding. “A straightforward
reading of the statute’s unrestrictive language leads
inexorably to the conclusion that all testimony in a Title VII
proceeding”—or at least the substance of such testimony—
“is protected against punitive employer action.”296
Thus, this was another case in which the court acknowledged the
participation clause’s broad language and its protection for almost all
participation activities.
Even cases that ultimately ruled in favor of employers have
acknowledged the participation clause is extremely broad. For
example, the Tenth Circuit in Vaughn v. Epworth Villa297
295. Egei v. Johnson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 2016) (first, second, and third alterations
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Glover, 170 F.3d at 414).
296. Id. at 89 (citations omitted) (quoting Glover, 170 F.3d at 414). The court also observed
that the Seventh Circuit’s position was “not premised on the language of the statute, but on a
disbelief that Congress could possibly have intended to protect” lying. Id.
297. 537 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2008).
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acknowledged the participation clause’s broad language when
concluding the plaintiff engaged in protected activity.298 Although the
court ultimately ruled the employer had a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for the adverse employment action, the court decided the
plaintiff had engaged in protected activity.299 The court reviewed how
other courts had applied broad protection under the participation
clause and had relied on that clause’s language.300 The court noted the
following:
“When interpreting the language of a statute, the starting
point is always the language of the statute itself.” . . . In this
case, the participation clause plainly provides that
individuals may not be retaliated against when they
“participate[ ] in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under” Title VII. We fail to see how this language
places the kind of obligation on the employee that the district
court here imposed—the obligation to resort only to honest
and loyal conduct in advancing a claim unless the employee
proves that it is necessary to resort to other means. . . .
“‘[R]ead naturally, the word “any” has an expansive
meaning,’ and thus, so long as ‘Congress did not add any
language limiting the breadth of that word,’ the term ‘any’
must be given literal effect.” Accordingly, given the plain
language of the participation clause, we must conclude that
[the plaintiff] engaged in a “protected activity” when she
submitted the unredacted medical records to the EEOC.301
Although the court ultimately ruled that terminating the plaintiff
for providing unredacted records to the EEOC was a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action, the court determined that,
based on the participation clause’s language, the conduct was
298. Id. at 1151–52.
299. Id. at 1152–55.
300. Id. at 1152. The court relied on the following cases when addressing the participation
clause’s broad protection: Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2003); Booker v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency,
588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006
n.18 (5th Cir. 1969); and Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2006). Vaughn,
537 F.3d at 1152. After reviewing those cases, the court noted: “Based on the participation clause’s
plain language, we believe the broad coverage afforded to the clause by these courts is well
founded.” Id.
301. Id. (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). The court was careful to note it was not
addressing whether such broad protection should be afforded to fraudulent claims. Id. at 1152 n.2.
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protected for the purpose of establishing a prima facie case.302 Of
course, this was of little consolation to the plaintiff, as the court
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the
employer.303
Other courts that reached pro-employer outcomes have also
concluded the statute’s language provides broad protection for
participation activity. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Villa v.
CavaMezze Grill, LLC,304 acknowledged the participation clause’s
language was “unambiguous and specific,” and that its broad
protection leads to the conclusion that “firing someone for testifying
in a Title VII deposition is plainly prohibited, regardless of whether
the testimony is unreasonable.”305 Even though that court ultimately
ruled against the plaintiff, it did acknowledge the participation
clause’s breadth.306
Despite numerous courts’ broad interpretations of the
participation clause’s language, there are some arguments against
such a broad interpretation of that language, which courts could try to
use if they want to avoid protecting employees who knowingly engage
in false participation activities. One argument against such a broad
interpretation of the “in any manner” language is that this phrase
follows specific actions such as making a charge, testifying, or
assisting, and as a result, the “participated in any manner” language
refers only to other, similar actions, and not to particular motives the
person has while engaging in the activity.307

302. Id. at 1152–55. The court ruled against the plaintiff because it decided the plaintiff’s
activity was also a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. Id. at 1154.
303. Id. at 1155. By allowing the employer to prevail at the legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason/pretext stage, the court minimized the relevance of the prima facie case. See Hatmaker v.
Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[P]articipation doesn’t insulate an employee
from being discharged for conduct that, if it occurred outside an investigation, would warrant
termination. This includes making frivolous accusations, or accusations grounded in prejudice.”
(citations omitted)).
304. 858 F.3d 896 (4th Cir. 2017).
305. Id. at 902 (citing Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414–15 (4th Cir. 1999)). The
court also noted that in the opposition context, prohibiting employers from disciplining employees
who fabricate allegations was not appropriate. Id. at 901–02.
306. Id. at 902 (“[T]he text of the participation clause is unambiguous and specific.” (quoting
Glover, 170 F.3d at 415)); see also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc.,
221 F.3d 1171, 1174–76 (11th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001)
(acknowledging the breadth of the participation clause’s language).
307. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018).
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The Seventh Circuit in Hatmaker v. Memorial Medical Center308
made a similar point and rejected the idea that the participation
clause’s language requires such an expansive interpretation.309 The
court criticized pro-plaintiff courts’ broad interpretations of the
participation clause by stating the following:
To these courts[,] “participated in any manner” in an
investigation seems to mean “participated by any and all
means” rather than participated in any capacity, whether
formally or informally, whether as complainant or as a
witness, and at whatever stage of the investigation. But these
courts can’t actually believe that forging documents and
coercing witnesses to give false testimony are protected
conduct. And if they don’t believe that, why do they think
lying is protected?310
Thus, the Hatmaker court appears to believe that the “in any
manner” refers to particular acts of participation, not to the motivation
behind those acts.311 This interpretation seems to utilize the canon of
statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which provides as follows:
“[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory
enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific
words.”312 Using this canon of construction is one way courts can
avoid protecting individuals who knowingly engage in false
participation activities, while still adhering to the statutory language.
Specifically, courts can interpret “in any manner” as referring only to
actions like making a charge, testifying, and taking other actions
associated with the EEO process.
Another argument against such a broad reading of the
participation clause is the rule that courts can ignore a statute’s
language if applying that language would yield an absurd result.313 At
308. 619 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2010).
309. Id. at 746. This case involved an internal complaint, not one that occurred either as a result
of, or simultaneously with, the filing of an EEOC charge. Id. at 745.
310. Id. at 746.
311. See id.
312. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Est. of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371,
384 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15
(2001)).
313. See, e.g., Colón-Marrero v. Vélez, 813 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Our starting point in
discerning the meaning of a statute is the provision itself, and ‘[t]he plain meaning of a statute’s
text must be given effect “unless it would produce an absurd result or one manifestly at odds with
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least one court has referenced this rule when addressing the
participation clause.314 The court in Glover, when deciding to protect
the plaintiff’s participation activity, stated that providing such
protection “would not lead . . . to an absurd result.”315 Specifically, the
court stated:
This interpretation would not lead, as SLED contends, to an
absurd result. Our holding does not permit employees to
immunize improper behavior simply by filing an EEOC
complaint. “[A]n EEOC complaint creates no right on the
part of an employee to miss work, fail to perform assigned
work, or leave work without notice.” Employers retain, as
they always have, the right to discipline or terminate
employees for any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.316
Thus, the court was willing to adhere to what it believed the
statute’s language required—protection for the plaintiff’s
participation activity—and the court believed that applying the
statutory language did not yield an absurd result.317 Of course, if a
court did not wish to protect employees who knowingly engage in
false participation activity, the court could conclude that protecting
such behavior would yield the absurd result that an employee would
be protected for engaging in malicious and deceptive behavior.
As has been addressed, courts that adopt a broad interpretation of
the participation clause do so, in part, because of the clause’s
language. As was also pointed out, however, if courts do not want to
reward false and malicious actions, there are possible avenues to
pursue without ignoring the statutory language. The statutory
language is not, however, the only reason courts might have to protect
these employees. As will be addressed next, some courts do so to be
consistent with the EEOC, which has expressed its position that the
participation clause does provide protection in these circumstances.318

the statute’s intended effect.”’” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Arnold v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 858 (1st Cir. 1998), abrogated by Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999))).
314. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999).
315. Id. at 414–15 (emphasis added).
316. Id. at 414 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. Ralston Purina Co.,
557 F.2d 570, 572 (6th Cir. 1977)).
317. Id. at 414–15.
318. See Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra note 14.
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B. The EEOC Supports a Broad Interpretation of the Participation
Clause
Another reason courts protect knowingly false participation
activities is that the EEOC, the agency charged with administering
Title VII, has expressed its position that such protection is
warranted.319 Although the EEOC’s position is not always binding on
the courts,320 several courts have deferred to the EEOC on this issue.321
The EEOC has stated the following:
Participation in the EEO process is protected whether or not
the EEO allegation is based on a reasonable, good faith
belief that a violation occurred. This does not mean that
falsehoods or bad faith are without consequence. An
employer is free to bring these to light in the EEO matter,
where it may rightly affect the outcome. But it is unlawful
retaliation for an employer to take matters into its own hands
and impose consequences for participating in an EEO
matter.322
The EEOC has also stated the following regarding Title VII’s
anti-retaliation provision’s opposition clause and participation clause:
An individual is protected from retaliation for opposition to
discrimination as long as s/he had a reasonable and good faith
319. Id.
320. The EEOC’s position is “‘not entitled to full Chevron deference,’ but it is entitled to a
‘measure of respect under the less deferential . . . standard’ because it ‘reflect[s] a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’”
Calhoun v. EPS Corp., 36 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1357 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted), vacated in part, No. 13-cv-2954, 2014 WL 12799080 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014).
The Supreme Court has, at times, ignored the EEOC’s position on other issues regarding federal
EEO statutes. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004)
(rejecting the EEOC’s position regarding the scope of the ADEA because the EEOC’s position was
“clearly wrong”); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (rejecting the EEOC’s
position regarding how to decide whether an individual has a disability under the ADA because the
EEOC’s position was “an impermissible interpretation of the ADA”), superseded by statute, ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–59.
321. See, e.g., Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1356–57; see also Wesolowski v. Napolitano, No.
CV 211-163, 2013 WL 1286207, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2013) (“Additionally, the EEOC
Compliance Manual makes a clear distinction between opposition and participation, requiring a
reasonable good faith belief for the former and explicitly not requiring that for the latter.”); Mezu
v. Morgan State Univ., No. WMN-09-2855, 2013 WL 3934013, at *10–11 (D. Md. July 29, 2013)
(citing to Wesolowski and to the EEOC Compliance Manual, concluding “that the Fourth Circuit
would follow the clear majority rule and not require participation clause plaintiffs to establish
reasonable belief in the merits of their underlying charge or complaint”).
322. Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra
note 29 (emphasis added).
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belief that s/he was opposing an unlawful discriminatory
practice, and the manner of opposition was reasonable. An
individual is protected against retaliation for participation
in the charge process, however, regardless of the validity or
reasonableness
of
the
original
allegation
of
discrimination.323
As stated earlier, courts have relied on the EEOC’s position when
deciding to protect false participation activities. For example, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia relied
on the EEOC’s position when discussing the breadth of the
participation clause’s protection.324 In acknowledging a broad level of
protection, the court relied on the EEOC Compliance Manual when it
noted a plaintiff is protected under the participation clause regardless
of whether the allegations in the original charge were valid or
reasonable.325 Other courts have also relied on the EEOC’s position,
providing broader protection under the participation clause than under
the opposition clause.326
Therefore, in addition to the participation clause’s plain language,
the EEOC’s position provides another reason it might be necessary to
protect employees who knowingly engage in false participation
activities. If, however, courts do not feel comfortable granting such
protection, they can deny protection by ignoring the EEOC’s position,
323. Section 2 Threshold Issues, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (May 12, 2000),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section-2-threshold-issues#2-II-A-5 (emphasis added).
324. Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1356–57; see also Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262,
268 (3d Cir. 2006) (relying on the EEOC Compliance Manual for the proposition that “a plaintiff
is protected under the participation clause ‘regardless of whether the allegations in the original
charge were valid or reasonable’”).
325. Calhoun, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 1356–57 (relying on the EEOC’s Compliance Manual for the
proposition that “courts have consistently held that a respondent is liable for retaliating against an
individual for filing an EEOC charge regardless of the validity or reasonableness of the charge”).
As noted earlier, the court in Calhoun reversed its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, but it did once again note the participation clause’s “near-absolute” protection.
Calhoun v. EPS Corp., No. 13-cv-2954, 2014 WL 12799080, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014). Also
see Booth v. Pasco County, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1201 (M.D. Fla. 2011), where the court cited to
Slagle, 435 F.3d at 268, for relying on the EEOC’s position that “a plaintiff is protected under the
participation clause ‘regardless of whether the allegations in the original charge were valid or
reasonable.’”
326. See Wesolowski, 2013 WL 1286207, at *7 (“Additionally, the EEOC Compliance Manual
makes a clear distinction between opposition and participation, requiring a reasonable good faith
belief for the former and explicitly not requiring that for the latter.”); Mezu, 2013 WL 3934013, at
*10–11 (citing to Wesolowski and to the EEOC Compliance Manual and concluding “that the
Fourth Circuit would follow the clear majority rule and not require participation clause plaintiffs
to establish reasonable belief in the merits of their underlying charge or complaint”).
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saying it is an unreasonable interpretation of Title VII.327 In addition
to the statutory language and the EEOC’s position, however, there is
another reason courts might have to protect this type of activity;
specifically, the popular, pro-employer argument that protecting these
employees would guarantee them workplace tenure is not true.
C. Providing Protection Will Not Provide “Tenure” for Bad
Employees.
One reason employers give for trying to limit the participation
clause is that bad employees will be able to achieve workplace tenure
simply by filing EEOC charges.328 Despite the appeal of this argument
to employers, this is not true. As some courts and the EEOC have
recognized, employers are still free to discipline employees for poor
performance or for other legitimate reasons.329 Employers are
prohibited only from disciplining an employee because of his EEO
activities.330
One court that addressed this issue was the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida.331 In Booth, the court noted
that adopting a broad interpretation of the participation clause “does
not render employers hostage to vindictive employees. Employers
may still discipline, and/or terminate employees who filed EEOC
charges, they simply cannot do so because they filed such a charge.”332
The Fourth Circuit also recognized protecting this type of
participation would not allow employees to gain tenure by filing
EEOC charges.333 In Glover, the court determined that even though
327. See supra note 325.
328. See, e.g., Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2010); Mattson v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004).
329. See, e.g., Booth, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 n.20; see also Enforcement Guidance on
Retaliation and Related Issues, supra note 14 (“The breadth of these anti-retaliation protections
does not mean that employees can immunize themselves from consequences for poor performance
or improper behavior by raising an internal EEO allegation or filing a discrimination claim with an
enforcement agency.”).
330. Booth, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 n.20.
331. Id.
332. Id.; see also Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir.
1989) (“However, the fact an employee files a complaint or a charge does not create any right on
the part of the employee ‘to miss work, fail to perform assigned work, or leave work without
notice,’ unless absence from work is necessitated by proceedings that occur subsequent to the filing
of a complaint or charge.” (citation omitted)). Although Booker involved a state-law retaliation
claim, it is another example of a court noting that filing EEOC charges does not, as employers have
contended, provide job security for bad employees. See id.
333. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999).
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Title VII protects unreasonable testimony, that determination “does
not permit employees to immunize improper behavior simply by filing
an EEOC complaint.”334 The court continued, noting that such a
complaint “creates no right on the part of an employee to miss work,
fail to perform assigned work, or leave work without notice[,]”335 and
“[e]mployers retain, as they always have, the right to discipline or
terminate employees for any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”336
The EEOC has also recognized that filing an EEOC charge does
not immunize a worker from an adverse employment action.337
Specifically, the EEOC has stated the following:
Neither participation nor opposition give permission to an
employee to neglect job duties, violate employer rules, or do
anything else that would otherwise result in consequences for
poor performance evaluations or misconduct. Even though
the anti-retaliation laws are very broad, employers remain
free to discipline or terminate employees for poor
performance or improper behavior, even if the employee
made an EEO complaint.338
Some courts, on the other hand, have agreed with employers that,
despite the EEOC’s position on this issue, and despite several courts’
statements that employers can still terminate employees who engage
in participation activities, bad employees will be allowed to gain job
security by filing EEOC charges.339 One such court was the Seventh
Circuit, which stated the following: “[s]imilarly, an employee could
assure himself unlimited tenure by filing continuous complaints with
the government agency if he fears that his employer will discover his
duplicitous behavior at the workplace.”340 Although some employers
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id.
Id. (quoting Brown v. Ralston Purina Co., 557 F.2d 570, 572 (6th Cir. 1977)).
Id.
Small Business Fact Sheet: Retaliation and Related Issues, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/small-businessfact-sheet-retaliation-and-related-issues (“Engaging in EEO activity does not shield an employee
from discipline or discharge. Employers are free to discipline or terminate workers if motivated by
non-retaliatory and non-discriminatory reasons that would otherwise result in such
consequences.”).
338. Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, supra
note 29.
339. See, e.g., Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2010); Mattson v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004).
340. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891; see also Hatmaker, 619 F.3d at 745–46 (citing Mattson for this
proposition and rejecting unlimited protection under the participation clause).

(8) 54.4_ROSENTHAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1198

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

11/18/21 12:37 PM

[Vol. 54:1151

have convinced courts of this possibility, other courts and the EEOC
have argued this is not true, as employers are still free to terminate bad
employees.341 The only limitation is the employer cannot do so
because an employee engaged in participation activities.342
So, while a broad interpretation of the participation clause might
have to protect employees if they knowingly file false charges or
provide false testimony in an EEO proceeding, employers are still free
to take adverse actions against those employees if, notwithstanding
their participation activities, their job performance warrants discipline.
As a result, the employers’ argument that employees can achieve
workplace tenure by filing malicious EEOC charges is incorrect and
is another reason courts might have to protect these activities. The
final reason for this pro-employee outcome, Title VII’s purpose and
process (including the EEOC’s role in that process), will now be
addressed.
D. Providing Broad Protection Is Consistent with Title VII’s
Remedial Scheme, and Not Providing Protection Will Deter
Employees with Legitimate Claims from Coming Forward343
In addition to the previously discussed reasons why courts might
have to protect individuals who knowingly engage in false
participation activity, there is yet another reason for doing so.
Specifically, several courts have noted that Title VII’s goal of
eliminating workplace discrimination, and the EEOC’s role in that
process, are critical, and therefore, filing EEOC charges (or
participating in another person’s EEO proceeding) requires the utmost
protection.344 Cases that have addressed this issue will now be
addressed.
One court to rely on this argument was the court in the seminal
case of Pettway.345 In Pettway, the court relied heavily on Title VII’s
341. See, e.g., Glover, 170 F.3d at 414.
342. Id. at 414–15.
343. In addition to the cases that will be discussed in this Section, the EEOC, in an earlier
version of its Compliance Manual, also expressed concern that limiting the participation clause
would frustrate Congress’s intent by deterring employees from asserting claims. See U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II(C)(2) (1998) (“[P]ermit[ting]
an employer to retaliate against a charging party based on its unilateral determination that the
charge was unreasonable or otherwise unjustified would chill the rights of all individuals protected
by the anti-discrimination statutes.”).
344. See infra remaining discussion in Section IV.D.
345. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969).

(8) 54.4_ROSENTHAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/18/21 12:37 PM

2021] EMPLOYEE’S RIGHT TO FILE FALSE EEOC CHARGES 1199

function and structure when deciding the plaintiff’s false and
defamatory statements were protected.346 The court stated:
This is particularly required under the machinery set up by
Title VII. Unlike so many Governmental structures in
administrative law, EEOC is an administrative agency
without the power of enforcement. . . . The burden of
enforcement rests on the individual through his suit in
Federal District Court. But charges must first have been filed
with EEOC. Consequently, the filing of charges and the
giving of information by employees is essential to the
Commission’s administration of Title VII, the carrying out
of the congressional policy embodied in the Act and the
invocation of the sole sanction of Court compulsion through
employee instituted suit. . . . This is often the only way that
such issues can be raised—by an individual drafting his
charge as best he can without expert legal advice. This
activity, essential as it is, must be protected.347
The court then noted a protected activity would acquire a
“precarious status” if employees filing EEOC charges could be fired
for doing so.348 The court emphasized the broad protection needed for
“those who seek the benefit of statutes designed by Congress to
equalize employer and employee in matters of employment.”349 In
wrapping up this point, the court concluded the balance weighs in
favor of protecting these charges:
Congress . . . sought to evaluate and balance the competing
interests. On the one hand is the protection of the employer
from damage caused by maliciously libelous statements and
on the other is protection of the employee from racial and
other discrimination. In Title VII Congress sought to protect
the employer’s interest by directing that EEOC proceedings
be confidential and by imposing severe sanctions against
unauthorized disclosure. The balance is therefore struck in
346. Id.
347. Id. (footnote omitted). The court in Pettway also stated the following regarding the antiretaliation provision’s purpose: “[I]t is to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by
Congress to protect his rights. The Act will be frustrated if the employer may unilaterally determine
the truth or falsity of charges and take independent action.” Id.
348. Id. The court did refer to “innocent” employees, perhaps suggesting employees who
knowingly engage in false participation activity deserve less protection. Id.
349. Id. at 1006.
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favor of the employee in order to afford him the enunciated
protection from invidious discrimination, by protecting his
right to file charges.350
As a result, the court provided protection to the employee in
Pettway.351 And, as has been discussed, many courts have relied on
Pettway when defending an employee’s right to file EEOC charges (or
engage in other participation activity) regardless of the substance of
the employee’s allegations.352
Other courts have also addressed how protecting even
unreasonable participation is consistent with Title VII and the
procedure Congress established for enforcing it. For example, the
Fourth Circuit in Glover stated that adopting a broad interpretation of
the participation clause would be consistent with the goal of
“[m]aintaining
unfettered
access
to
statutory
remedial
mechanisms.”353 The court noted broad protections for participation
are warranted because they “ensure not only that employers cannot
intimidate their employees into foregoing the Title VII grievance
process, but also that [EEOC] investigators will have access to the
unchilled testimony of witness.”354 The court also noted participation
was “essential to the machinery set up by Title VII,”355 and that a
witness would “surely be less than forth-coming”356 “[i]f a witness in
a Title VII proceeding were secure from retaliation only when her
testimony met some slippery reasonableness standard.”357 Finally, the
court recognized that to further Congress’s intent, “some irrelevant

350. Id. at 1007 (citation omitted).
351. Id.
352. See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1175
(11th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with Pettway regarding the broad scope of the participation clause and
noting that providing broader protection to participation activity is consistent with the
congressional purpose behind Title VII), reh’g denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001).
353. Glover v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
354. Id.
355. Id. (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th Cir.
1998)).
356. Id.
357. Id. This case involved a plaintiff who alleged retaliation based on testimony she gave in
another employee’s EEO proceeding; nonetheless, this activity and filing EEOC charges both fall
under the participation clause. See id. at 412–13; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018).
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and even provocative testimony must be immunized so that Title VII
proceedings will not be chilled.”358
A United States District Court, relying on dicta from the D.C.
Circuit, also noted that protecting the substance of EEOC charges was
important to further the purpose for which Congress established the
EEOC.359 The court in Egei noted the following:
The obvious concern of Congress, in both the opposition and
participation clauses, was to protect the employee who dares
to speak out against his employer’s hiring practices. The
enforcement scheme Congress chose for Title VII relies
heavily on the initiative of aggrieved employees, whose
efforts in the public interest would be severely chilled if they
bore the risk of discharge whenever they were unable to
establish conclusively the merits of their claims.360
Later, the court expressed concern over how a strict interpretation
of the participation clause would chill employee complaints and
frustrate Title VII’s remedial scheme.361 First noting that broad
protection is “consistent with the remedial purpose”362 behind Title
VII, the court then stated, “[a]ctivities under the participation clause
are essential to the machinery set up by Title VII.”363 The court
wrapped up its discussion regarding this issue by noting that
participation activities “would be chilled, and Title VII’s scheme
frustrated, if employees’ bore the risk of discharge whenever they
were unable to establish conclusively the merits of their claims.’”364
358. Glover, 170 F.3d at 414. As noted earlier, the court rejected a reasonableness standard also
because it would lead to a “morass of collateral litigation” and a waste of judicial resources. Id. at
415.
359. Egei v. Johnson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 81, 89 (D.D.C. 2016). The District of Columbia Circuit’s
opinion to which the district court referred was Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 652 F.2d
1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
360. Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 89.
361. Id. at 89–90.
362. Id. at 89.
363. Id. (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th Cir.
1998)); see also Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Activities under
the participation clause are essential to the machinery set up by Title VII. As such, the scope of
protection for activity falling under the participation clause is broader than for activity falling under
the opposition clause.” (quoting Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259 n.4)).
364. Egei, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 89–90 (quoting Parker, 652 F.2d at 1019). The court distinguished
between good-faith but mistaken claims and false claims, but it noted that absent an employee’s
admission that he filed a knowingly false claim, the risk of chilling employee testimony existed.
Id. at 90. The court stated: “It would be cold comfort for claimants if they were nominally protected
from adverse action on the basis of their testimony, but only to the extent that a judge, an ALJ, or
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Thus, the court in Egei was concerned about the chilling effect
not protecting all statements made to the EEOC would have, and
therefore, the participation clause should provide very broad
protection.365 The court, like the courts described earlier, believed
Title VII’s purpose of eliminating workplace discrimination (and the
structure it created to enforce Title VII) would be frustrated if the court
adopted a more narrow interpretation of the participation clause.366
Not all courts agree that Title VII’s purpose and/or structure
supports protecting employees who knowingly engage in false
participation activities, and courts could rely on those arguments
should they feel uncomfortable protecting false and malicious
participation activity. The Seventh Circuit in Mattson, in concluding
false and malicious claims are not protected, noted the following
regarding Title VII:
Title VII was designed to protect the rights of employees who
in good faith protest the discrimination they believe they
have suffered and to ensure that such employees remain free
from reprisals or retaliatory conduct. Title VII was not
designed to “arm employees with a tactical coercive weapon”
under which employees can make baseless claims simply to
“advance their own retaliatory motives and strategies.”367
As a result of this reasoning, the court adopted an “utterly
baseless” standard for determining whether an employee engages in
protected participation conduct, which is the same approach the court
used when evaluating opposition conduct.368 Thus, the court ignored
even an employer concludes in ‘good faith’ that such testimony was false or malicious.” Id. The
court later stated it was not condoning lying or minimizing the effect such activity has on the
administrative process, but it concluded the risk of chilling participation would be too great if it
adopted a restrictive view of the participation clause. Id. Toward the end of the opinion, the court
again addressed this when it stated that the case did not address an employee who admitted to
making false or malicious statements, and that its holding was limited to situations where an
employee asserts the truth of the issue and the employer disbelieves him. Id. at 90–91.
365. Id. at 90.
366. Id. at 89–90; see also Calhoun v. EPS Corp., No. 13-cv-2954, 2014 WL 12799080, at *4
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014) (“If this were an opposition case, the result might be different. But
because the anti-discrimination laws grant near-absolute protection to participation activity, the
Court cannot abide this result. Doing so would discourage employees from filing legitimate
discrimination complaints and undermine the anti-discrimination regime.” (emphasis added)).
367. Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Spadola v. N.Y.C.
Transit Auth., 242 F. Supp. 2d 284, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); see also Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr.,
619 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2010) (relying on Mattson to conclude that the participation clause does
not provide absolute protection).
368. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891.
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the distinction most courts make, which is that the participation clause
provides more protection than the opposition clause.369 In fact, the
court noted providing more protection under the participation clause
would simply lead to employees filing more EEOC charges (rather
than filing only internal complaints), which the court viewed as an
abuse of Title VII and its procedures.370 Thus, if a court does not want
to protect employees who knowingly engage in false participation
activities, it could utilize the Mattson argument that doing so would
frustrate, rather than further, Congressional intent.
As this Section has demonstrated, some courts believe providing
very broad protection for participation activities is consistent with
Title VII and with the process Congress established for enforcing it,
while other courts have decided such broad protection would frustrate
Congress’s goals. This dispute is similar to the other disputes
regarding the reasons courts might/do not have to protect false charges
or false testimony, in that some courts have decided one way while
other courts have decided the other.371 Unless Congress acts to clarify
the participation clause’s scope, or unless the Supreme Court decides
to address this issue, there will continue to be confusion regarding the
scope of the participation clause’s protection.
V. CONCLUSION
For Title VII to effectively eradicate workplace discrimination,
employees must feel free to raise Title VII concerns with their
employers and with the EEOC. This is why Congress included an anti369. See id.; see also Hatmaker, 619 F.3d at 746 (relying on Mattson to note that providing
such broad protection would “encourage the abuse of Title VII and the proceedings that it
established”).
370. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891; see also Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 977
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (deciding false and malicious statements are protected, the court acknowledged
the following: “To extend the statute’s protection to malicious claims runs the obvious risk of
licensing, if not encouraging, bad faith discrimination claims by trouble-making, obstructionist
employees bent upon harassment. Could Congress, one wonders, really have had this in mind?”).
371. One other reason some courts have used when granting broad protection is that the target
of the false statements might be able to pursue other remedies. For example, Pettway addressed this
possibility of alternative remedies for employers. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998,
1007 n.22 (5th Cir. 1969). Specifically, the court stated that it “in no way impl[ied] that an employer
is preempted . . . from vindicating his reputation through resort to a civil action for malicious
defamation.” Id. The court in Booth also acknowledged potential remedies for targets of defamatory
charges. Booth v. Pasco Cnty., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1201 n.20 (M.D. Fla. 2011). The court stated:
“[f]or example, the filing of a defamatory charge may enable an employer to sue that employee for
defamation. In addition, a defendant may be awarded attorney’s fees and other costs for
successfully defending a frivolous action.” Id.
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retaliation provision that protects employees who oppose unlawful
employment practices and who participate in the process Congress
established for vindicating Title VII’s substantive rights. While both
activities are protected, it remains unclear how broad that protection
is under the participation clause. Specifically, courts disagree whether
knowingly engaging in false participation activities is protected
conduct.
Although it might seem distasteful to protect employees who
knowingly engage in false participation activities,372 there are reasons
why protecting these activities might be necessary. First, the
participation clause’s language contains no qualifiers, but rather it
protects individuals who participate “in any manner” in an EEO
proceeding. Second, the EEOC, which is responsible for administering
Title VII, has determined participation activities must be protected,
regardless of whether they are reasonable or true. Third, despite what
some employers argue, providing protection will not allow bad
employees to gain workplace tenure; if they are not good employees,
employers can still terminate them. Finally, placing limits on
participation activities is inconsistent with Congressional intent
because a heightened standard for protection would dissuade
employees from bringing legitimate Title VII claims and/or testifying
in others’ EEO proceedings. As a result of these reasons, when
deciding whether to protect deceptive employees, several courts have
tipped the scales in favor of doing so.
Although Congress has not amended Title VII in many years, if
it wants to deny protection for employees who knowingly engage in
false participation activity, it should amend Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision and limit its protection to employees who either oppose or
participate only if those actions are based on a reasonable, good-faith
belief the employer has engaged in unlawful conduct. Of course, the
Supreme Court could also decide whether its Breeden opinion, which
utilized a reasonable, good-faith-belief test in an opposition case,
should apply to participation cases as well. Until then, however, it
seems the scope of Title VII’s participation clause will continue to be
another unresolved issue regarding this very important antidiscrimination legislation.

372. See supra note 9.

